Challenges and implications of generative artiffcial intelligence for the epistemic subject
Hong Zhang
Chongqing College of Mobile Communication
DOI: https://doi.org/10.59429/esta.v12i4.12672
Keywords: generative artificial intelligence; epistemic subject; knowledge production
Abstract
This paper examines the historical evolution of the epistemic subject against the rise of generative artificial intelligence. By analyzing key phases of knowledge production, storage, and dissemination, it argues that the epistemic subject is undergoing a trend of de-anthropocentrism. In response to these shifts, humanity should leverage its unique agency, ground itself in embodied reality, and formulate reasonable expectations to balance the human-machine dynamic, thereby seeking a foundation for human subjectivity that transcends pure intelligence.
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