KiwiSaver: Navigating policy ideas and power dynamics in New Zealand’s pension system
Zenan Li
DOI: https://doi.org/10.59429/bam.v6i4.8356
Keywords: New Zealand Pension System; Public-private pension mix; Pension policy reform; Voluntary savings scheme
Abstract
This article examines the development, implementation, and political strategy behind KiwiSaver, New Zealand’s voluntary retirement savings program introduced in the early 2000s. Unlike previous pension models, KiwiSaver used a quasi-compulsory structure, balancing voluntary participation with incentives to encourage broad enrollment. This study analyzes the policy ideas, ideological shifts, and power dynamics involved, with a particular focus on Michael Cullen’s use of strategic ambiguity in navigating the complexities of New Zealand’s Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) parliamentary environment. By examining the interactions between the Labour government, opposition parties, unions, employer organizations, and the financial sector, this paper sheds light on how KiwiSaver reshaped New Zealand’s pension policy landscape, creating a model that integrates public and private interests through ideological flexibility and pragmatic compromise.
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